Reading Al Qaeda In Karachi

In the preface to his book Inside Al Qaeda And The Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11, the late Syed Saleem Shahzad wrote:

“I have never worked for any well-funded international news organizations. Nor have I worked for the mainstream national media. My affiliations have always remained with alternative media outlets. This has left me with narrow options and very little space to move around in… However, independent reporting for the alternative media best suits my temperament as it encourages me to seek the truth beyond “conventional wisdom”. ”

Available outside Pakistan

Before it led him to a tragic death, Saleem Shahzad’s quest for that elusive truth beyond conventional wisdom took him from walks on Clifton Beach with a military officer-turned-Al Qaeda strategist to nights spent in mud huts with Taliban militia men as helicopters passed overhead and drones struck in the distance. It took him from Pakistan to Iraq to Lebanon to Afghanistan and back to North Waziristan to meet raw recruits and hardened militants. Inside Al Qaeda And The Taliban, however, is not a book about one man’s fascination with other men who like guns. It is a well-researched, cogent argument for the need to recognize that a common tactical goal – death to America the 'Great Satan' – “does not make the two a single entity. Theirs is a unique relationship, in which Al Qaeda aims to bring the Taliban and all Muslim liberation movements into its fold and to use them to forward it’s global agenda.”


The creation and uses of the mujahideen – who helped defeat the Soviet Union – as a strategic asset to be deployed at will by the Pakistani military to help actualize its regional ambitions, has already been well documented. Shahzad’s book does, however, flesh out how exactly the transformation of some of them from idealistic Muslim youth seeking to repel invaders from Muslim lands into uber-violent jihadis thirsting for the blood of their former handlers, came about. Consider the story of Bin Yameen, also known as Ibn-e-Ameen, who the author identified as the actual enforcer behind the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) movement to declare Sharia law in Swat in 2009.

“Bin Yameen was 6 feet 2 inches tall, had a broad chest, was fair in complexion, and had a full head of hair. His looks were God’s gift, but his short temper was not inbuilt.… Born as a Behloolzai, a subtribe of the Youzufzai tribe, Bin Yameen was never the playboy of his village or a poet. He was a school dropout at the matric level. While he was still in his teens he went to Afghanistan and fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance forces of Ahmed Shah Massoud. He was arrested in his first battle and then spent seven long years in the inhuman jails of the Northern Alliance. Bin Yameen often remembers how his fellow Taliban detainees died in the jail. Sometimes he witnessed their swift deaths while they were talking or cooking. After the Taliban defeat, he was released by the United States.

“But it was not his seven years in the Northern Alliance jails that embittered him. After his release from [a Panjsheri] prison, his manners were still extraordinarily polite. He always stood up to welcome any guest. The marriage and love life of any Pashtun has always been a very private business. No Pashtun from a village background would ever confide in anyone over matters of the heart. But Bin Yameen used to proudly say that his wife (also his relative) had fallen in love with him and that before their marriage, when they were only engaged during his prolonged imprisonment in Afghanistan, all the family members had pressed her to break her engagement to him and marry someone else. But against all Pashtun traditions, the girl defied her family and said that her name would be tied to Bin Yameen’s forever, whether he lived or died. When Bin Yameen was released and went back to his village the first thing he did was to marry her, proud that this was the girl who had steadfastly stood by him despite all the pressures put on her by her family to forget him.

“Bin Yameen always said that all the pain and agony of his days in the Afghan prison disappeared after the marriage. It was as if nothing had happened. He started his new life with a loving wife. His wife delivered a son and they moved to Peshawar.”

The turning point for this man, according to the author, came after the December 2003 attempt on then President Musharraf’s life. In its aftermath, security agencies starting rounding up the jihadis they had till then supported.

“On August 21, 2004, Pakistan’s security agencies raided Bin Yameen’s house in Peshawar. He was sleeping with his wife. In the next room were two prominent jihadis.” The two managed to escape but the police who had broken into the house captured both Bin Yameen and his wife and “literally dragged them to their vehicles. Bin Yameen was half asleep and half awake, but he saw strangers touching his wife. He attacked them like a wounded lion. He tried to snatch their guns. It took dozens of security personnel to overwhelm him... Later his wife and son were released but Bin Yameen never forgot the humiliation suffered by his wife at the hands of Pakistan’s security personnel.”

After his release three years later he went on to become Al Qaeda’s secret mole in TNSM. They recognized the value of his “unbelievable” hatred – his politeness had become an insatiable thirst to slit the throats of Pakistan army personnel – and recruited him precisely because of it. Interestingly, this is the only time a woman (Bin Yameen's wife) makes an appearance in the book as anything other than a suicide bomber, Osama Bin Laden's daughter, or a purdah-observing student of the Lal Masjid seminary. The world Shahzad wrote about is clearly a world of men, for men, and the lives of women do not in any way figure in the anecdotes, conversations, analysis or vignettes that peppers its pages.


The militants in Swat were eventually pushed back into the Hindu Kush mountains, but Shahzad suggested there was another way to look at this apparent military victory.

“Pakistan’s secularists then boldly stood up against the Islamization of Pakistan. They called for the wings of Islamic seminaries in the country to be clipped. The government arranged religious conferences led by Sufis who spoke out against the Taliban. The Taliban retaliated by killing prominent Islamic scholars like Sarfaraz Naeemi. It seemed at first that the situation had turned against the militants, but behind the scenes Al Qaeda had succeeded in exploiting the ideological contradictions in Pakistan’s society, and deepened the ideological divide.

“In pursuit of this, Al Qaeda’s dialectical process, thousands of people were displaced, hundreds of people were killed, the national economy of Pakistan was on the verge of collapse, and Pakistan became completely dependent on US aid.”

Inside Al Qaeda And The Taliban offers many other examples of Al Qaeda’s ideological opportunism. Shahhzad sketches with forensic skill the way the movement capitalized on the growing disillusionment of operatives like Ilyas Kashmiri, the brothers Captain Khurram and Major Haroon, Major Abdul Rahman (three of whom were instrumental allegedly in the planning and execution of the Mumbai attacks), and Lal Masjid's Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, with the institutions that had once fostered them. Any questions or doubts anybody has about the chronology or motivations for the Lal Masjid incident might well be addressed by reading his take on life beyond the soundbites, the still images, the regurgitated narrative of revolutionary fervor meeting arrogant military might.


Shahzad also establishes chronologically, in detail, the character and purpose behind the umbrella group of what is today known as the TTP or Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. He traces how Al Qaeda, the heart of which is a philosophy held sacred by mostly foreigners who are relatively few in number, has over time infiltrated, influenced and started controlling these 'Neo Taliban.'


According to Shahzad, both the Masjid and the TNSM takeover of Swat were meant to divert attention from the tribal areas and buy Al Qaeda more time to consolidate its position there. Its ultimate goal? Expand the theater of war to include all modern day parts of ‘ancient Khurasan’, where the prelude to the “End of Times” battles were prophesied to begin. Khurasan today includes parts of Iran, the Central Asian republics, Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan. Ghazwa-e- Hind, or the battle for India, is also supposed to happen. After this the Muslim armies will march to the Middle East to join forces with the promised Mahdi and do battle against the Antichrist and its Western Allies for the Liberation of Palestine.


Essentially, Al Qaeda recognized Af-Pak way before the American and Pakistani establishment did. This is because, according to Shahzad, the organization has – thanks to the inspired use of its ‘human resources’ – always remained one step ahead of the great game.

“Before October 7, 2001 – when the United States attacked Afghanistan in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks, most of Al Qaeda’s top minds had already left the country, their mission focused on several targets:

• to ideologically cultivate new faces from strategic communities such as the armed forces and intelligence circles

• to bring in new recruits and establish cells

• to have each new cell assigned to raise its own resources and devise a plan, but have only one cell implement the plan, while the others served as decoys to 'misdirect' intelligence agencies”

Methods for ‘raising resources’ have included robbing banks and kidnapping Hindus and Ahmedis for ransom.


Since Musharraf first allied Pakistan to the US post-9/11 and the inevitable crackdown on jihadis began – the author’s thesis goes – Al Qaeda has waited, watched, and selected the, if not brightest, at least most committed former children of the US/Pak military machine to turn on their parents. On one level, it is Freudian: kill your mother (Pakistan), kill your father (the army, any army, dates are fluid, and which parent remembers the exact moment of conception anyway?). On another level, it is frightening: we are not even targets, we are collateral damage, and the suicide bombers' strings are being pulled by a parasitic entity that spreads from host to host in less time than it takes for Ansar Abbasi to go from ‘ISI good’ to ‘ISI bad.’


Other points that the book makes:


• Al Qaeda wants to keep the US in the region, engaged and off balance, till such time as the world’s mightiest ‘military machine’ has been bled dry


• Al Qaeda does not wish for a peace deal between the US and the Afghan Taliban because they want to continue to use US occupation of ‘Muslim lands’ as a rallying call for Muslims around the world. The creation of the TTP, the ‘Neo Taliban’, could also be seen as a move to woo fighters away from purely Afghan Taliban interests, which have more to do with ending the US invasion than they do with waiting for the Mahdi


• Al Qaeda feels – correctly as it turns out – that Pakistan’s tribal areas, with their virtually impregnable mountain ranges, are the perfect bases for the global Islamic insurgency. (Sadly, the book was completed before the ‘Arab Spring’, and any opportunity for the author to comment on how that changed the propaganda context.)


• Al Qaeda accomplished what no one had been able to do in Pakistan’s seven tribal agencies before: break the back of the local sardar/ jirga system


• Al Qaeda’s “Egyptian camp” of core ideologues can be perceived as the ‘intelligentsia of fundamentalism.’ This can either mean they are highly intelligent, learned, well read scholars of history, religion, philosophy and warfare. Or that every third Friday after lights out they regroup in a forest wearing all black to drink wine, smoke cheroots and debate existentialism. Probably the former.


• Saudi Osama Bin Laden might have been the face of Al Qaeda, but Egyptian Ayman Al Zwahiri was always the brains


• Zwahiri’s strategic vision has been to divide and rule, create splits between establishment/ ruling elite and the ordinary citizens of Muslim countries, discord between rulers and people being fertile recruiting ground for pan-Islamic ideals as well as yet another way to diffuse energy that might otherwise be directed at tackling Al Qaeda itself


Like the title suggests, Shahzad’s book is more about the growth and spread of the Taliban and Al Qaeda and tracing the patterns of diversion and consolidation contained therein than it is about the merits and demerits of the policies of the United States of America. It assumes that anyone reading it already has a cursory grasp of recent history. There is, therefore, only the occasional reference to the ‘cowboy’ nature of the American state (throw a rock at it and it will charge you in a tank). It is pretty much assumed that that a particular nation’s role in getting itself into the situation it finds itself in today is understood. Similarly short shrift is paid to Pakistan’s political leadership. Despite the role of the Jamaat-e-Islami, members of PML(Q), Imran Khan and Maulana Fazlur Rehman in giving militants legitimacy in the eyes of the public, they come across as a bunch of non-entities, attached like remoras to the sharks in the water.


It is also pretty much assumed that the reader understands that the Pakistani establishment’s official policy towards the spread of pseudo-Islamic fascism is dictated largely by the aforementioned American cowboys.

“Benazir Bhutto’s murder had undone the US scheme for Pakistan. Washington was compelled to change its entire roadmap. Under the new arrangement General Musharraf was an irritant and he was bade farewell. The United States then welcomed Zardari as the new president… it was now Admiral Mullen and General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani who were central to the Pakistan-US equation.”

Shahzad listed some of the salient features of the new relationship. They included: The Pakistan Army being in sole charge of military operations while “parliament and the civil administration were there simply to provide coordination and moral support ”, a US$1 billion plan to expand the US presence in Pakistan’s capital city, Islamabad, private security firms (DynCorp aka Blackwater) setting up offices in Islamabad “where they had already rented 284 houses, besides setting up bases in Peshawar and Quetta. In addition, Pakistan was to provide land in Tarbela to the United States for its operations ”, and the ISI setting up a “syndicated intelligence service under a proxy network to provide information to be transmitted to the CIA predator drones used to target the top Al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan’s tribal areas.”


That plan never came to fruition though. Shahzad established how often the Pakistani national security apparatus was outmaneuvered, sabotaged or made to just look plain stupid. This ranged from things like assuming the US would be defeated in Afghanistan in five years, after which ties with militants it wanted dead could be quietly resumed, to not predicting that the deadly cadres would turn their attention to Pakistan’s cities, to not knowing Musharraf's security officer Major Farooq was a member of Hizbur Tahrir and helped Major Haroon bring night vision goggles into the country from China, to not preparing adequately to fight a guerilla war, to mistreating the wrong prisoners during interrogation, to pampering the wrong prisoners during detention, to not knowing militants were about to utilize a shelved ISI contingency plan for a terror attack in India in the tragic events in Mumbai in 2008.


To this we can now add, not knowing Osama Bin Laden was in Abbottabad, and not knowing who killed Syed Saleem Shahzad.

Syed Saleem Shahzad: writing with his blood

We are left to draw our own conclusions about, on a policy level, how much of that failure to recognize an enemy within was deliberate or unwitting. Khaled Ahmed, in this excellent piece for The Friday Times, lists what some of those conclusions might be: TTP does nothing without approval from Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda killed Benazir, Pakistan army has ex-officers in Al Qaeda as well as serving officers collaborating with these ex-officers, and Islamic radicalization of Pakistani society and media mixed with fear of being assassinated by Al Qaeda agents - who include ex-army officers - have tilted the balance of power away from the state of Pakistan to Al Qaeda.


The book also examines the ideological and literary inspirations behind Al Qaeda, and compares and contrasts it with other ‘Muslim liberation’ movements across the globe. These brief chapters, and the few times Shahzad felt compelled to romanticize mountain warriors as Iqbal’s shaheen(s) “Swooping, shocking, then retiring, pouncing on the prey/ I do all this to keep my blood warm”, are the only times the author’s voice deviates from the dispassionate narrator position he inhabits for most of the book.


It takes a particularly courageous, or particularly foolish, person to probe the murky world of terror outfits and ambiguously-oriented militaries in the way that the late author did. Those who do tend to either be accused of fulfilling someone else’s agenda, or dismissed as conspiracy theorists because most of what they write cannot be verified immediately. This dilemma, and the narrative sensitivity Syed Saleem Shahzad displayed when discussing abstract philosophy and human psychology, only makes one more curious about who he was, how he was able to experience people and places others have been unable to access, and which of the exceedingly dangerous positions he put himself in was responsible for his horrific murder.

The Curious Case of the Allegedly Fake Flogging Video

So, in the last few days, I was confronted by people who claimed that the infamous flogging video from Swat - you know, the one in which a burqa clad woman is held down by some bearded men while being publicly flogged and which caused immense disgust across Pakistan and the world exactly one year ago - had now been proved to be fake. Since I was clueless about any such news, they proceeded to inform me that not only had The News conclusively reported that the video was faked by an NGO (ostensibly to defame Pakistan and the righteous Muslims of Swat as well as to make it easier for the army to gather public opinion on its side for an operation against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP), but that even Kamran Khan had talked about the fakery on his programme on Geo.

I had to do a bit of searching to find the 'news item' referred to. There was a reason I had not seen it: it never appeared in the print edition of the Karachi paper (the one I get). I'm not sure if it actually appeared in the Islamabad and Lahore editions, but surprisingly, it was on the web - even though the web edition of The News is actually culled from the Karachi edition. Here is what the 'news item' was, in its entirety:

Video of girl’s flogging in Swat was ‘fake’

Monday, March 29, 2010

"PESHAWAR: A resident of Swat, who claims to have prepared the fake video of flogging of a girl in Swat, has termed it drama and revealed that he received Rs0.5 million for doing so before the launch of military operation ‘Rah-e-Rast’.

Before the operation ‘Rah-e-Rast’, an NGO financed preparation of fake video of flogging in which they portrayed the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) members flogging a woman. The provincial government and Malakand Commissioner Syed Muhammad Javed ordered investigations and sought report from the authorities concerned.

After the successful operation in Malakand division, the law-enforcement agencies had arrested the children who were present in the video while a resident of Swat was apprehended by Kohat administration. The children and the arrested man revealed that the video was fake and said that it was made on the demand of Islamabad-based NGO which provided him Rs0.5 million.

Sources revealed that woman who was flogged in the video was also arrested and she revealed that she had received Rs0.1 million while Rs50,000 were given to each child. Sources said that the NGO produced the video to defame the country’s integrity and respect.

Sources stated that the law-enforcement agencies dispatched the report about the arrests of the culprits and proposed action against the NGO. They also said that the security agencies also apprehended the TTP workers who flogged the people."

Now, there are a couple or three points to note in this report, which should be glaringly obvious to any half-decent reporter or editor.

1. There is no byline.

2. The 'sources' are all anonymous.

3. Even the 'resident of Swat' who makes these serious claims is not identified.

These, ladies and gentlemen, are all straightforward clues that the 'report' is what is known in Pakistani journalistic parlance, as a 'plant' or 'planted story.' Obviously, at least one news editor came to the same conclusion and decided NOT to carry the story (i.e. the Karachi edition), which should give us some indication of how seriously it was taken. Now, who planted the story, how it was managed and with what motives, is up to you to judge. But there is no iota of doubt in my mind that the story deserved to be killed, at least until some serious questions were asked about its sources and credibility.

Of course, that has not stopped the assorted nutjobs going ballistic on various net forums about conspiracy theories involving the West, RAW, the army, NGOs and Westernized liberals. You can see a sample of their frothing at the mouth on Teeth Maestro's blog here and the Pakistan Defence Forum blog here. You may recall that the Supreme Commander of the Nutjobs, Aamir Liaquat Hussain, had even at the time of the surfacing of the video attempted to discredit the video on his show and in his Jang columns, while weasels like Ansar Abbasi  had simultaneously attempted to justify the barbarism (God, I'd almost forgotten why the man makes my blood boil!).

Just to remind ourselves of the actual circumstances of the case at the the time (rather than the planted stories appearing now), you can read what Dawn had reported on 4 April 2009 via DawnNews, or take a look at TTP spokesman Muslim Khan accepting responsibility for the flogging here:





Small wonder, then, that human rights campaigner and filmmaker Samar Minallah, who helped to publicise the video in the media, has reacted with a blistering and eloquent rejoinder in the oped pages of The News and The Daily Times. After all, the planted story was squarely targeted at her. You really should read her piece fully. But what is really needed is for The News to issue a clarification about the unsourced report. If it stands by its story, it should tell us what its sources are. If not, it should issue an apology, not only to Samar Minallah but to all its readers. It's about time there was some accountability for the media too.

The revised tourists' guide to the new Pakistan

Let's admit it. Travel guides to Pakistan are not exactly setting the international best-seller lists on fire these days. Most of those still collecting dust on the shelves are terribly out of date too.

Given that there is no discernible stampede by tourists eager to board Pakistan-bound flights, let us hope that some unsuspecting gora hippy living in a time-warp doesnt actually buy an out-of-print guide and set off to Pakistan believing that Swat is still the Switzerland of the east, full of friendly people dying to meet foreigners. In the new Swat, dying is the operative word, especially if Mr and Ms Hippy insist on spending too much time with the the poor locals. And Matta, despite what the guide books say, is NOT a picturesque side valley worth a day trip for those foreigners interested in exploring the area's Buddhist heritage.

So time to edit and update these guide books. And where better to start then to tell foreigners the do's and dont's of the new, post-terrorism Pakistan. Here are some faux pas that a foreigner, expat or naive Paki MUST avoid in the new Pakistan:

Do not take Daniel Pearl's parents to lunch at the Village restaurant in Karachi

Never invite Sri Lankan guests, especially cricket-loving ones, to go shopping in Liberty Market in Lahore.

If you happen to encounter Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari on the Murree Road, do NOT invite him for a picnic in Liaqat Bagh.

Do not phone in a request for " choli ke peechhe kia hai" if you happen to be listening to the Fazalullah channel on your FM radio.

If you are a foreign company that has built an overhead bridge on Sharea Faisal in Karachi, do not invite Iftikhar Chaudhry to inaugurate it.

Refrain from requesting Rehman Malik to personally supervise your security if you are heading a high-powered foreign delegation anywhere in Pakistan but especially in Rawalpindi.

Avoid asking friends, and especially Swat locals, if they want to hang at the central chowk in Mingora.

Never say you would love a fauji cut at a Mingora barber's shop.

Do not ask a prostitute, or anyone in the area for that matter, to give you head.

Do not say you are a firm believer in the Sufi philosophy in the vicinity of Swat.

Never give a motivational anti-Taliban lecture to a burqa-clad woman in an IDP camp. You never know who she/he might turn out to be.

Do not insist that your New Zealand friend take the window seat in a restaurant at the PC in Karachi.

Similarly, avoid asking your French engineer friend to take a coach if he is to meet you at the Karachi Sheraton.

Never confess you studied engineering in Poland if you are travelling in Balochistan.

Do not tell the suspicious security guard manning the entrance that you could kill to get into the Marriott, Islamabad or Karachi, even if you are very tired and have travelled 24 hours to get there.

If you are a neo-communist liberation theologist, do not venture into the Lal masjid believing you will meet like-minded radicals there.

Never go up to young men ticking loudly and ask them what time it is. Just run.

Do not send the link of this post to Ansar Abbassi. Unless you fancy a visit from the cyber crimes unit at midnight...

Any other tips for the unsuspecting foreigner that I might have left out?

Kayani Channeling Shakespeare?

"General Kayani takes Ariel view of operation Rah-e-Rast"

You can imagine my surprise when I saw this poetic heading in The News. I mean, who would ever have thought that literary demons lurked inside our chief of army staff? And that too of such a Tempest-uous nature?

Of course, nothing of the sort was actually true. The excited click-through yielded only the most banal of news items about F-16 trips over Swat and the like. Chalk one more up to the unerringly jaahil sub-editors and worse proof-readers who still can't spell aerial...

But it got me thinking: what if this heading were true? What if, in the middle of the "fight for Pakistan's survival" and the drive to "uproot militancy from the country", COAS Ashfaq Pervez Kayani were, in fact, channeling Shakespeare? What if, he were taking an "Ariel view of Operation Rah-e-Rast?"

Would he be saying to the public still ambivalent about the Taliban: "If of life you keep a care,/ Shake off slumber, and beware:/ Awake, awake!"

Or in an address to the jawans: "While you here do snoring lie/ Open-eyed conspiracy/ His time doth take."

He could even send out a message to Baitullah Mehsud: "Being most unfit to live. I have made you mad;/And even with such-like valour men hang and drown/ Their proper selves."

Of course, he could also express the army's abiding distrust of politicians thus: "Before you can say 'come' and 'go',/ And breathe twice and cry 'so, so,'/ Each one, tripping on his toe,/ Will be here with mop and mow."

Please feel free to add more Ariel quotes at leisure. May Pakistan Prospero.

From the Sublime to the Ridiculous

In the middle of the frenzy about the army operation in Swat / Buner / Dir, the news of kidnappings and recovery of scores of cadets, the apparent killing of thousands of militants and military personnel, and the disaster of the millions displaced from their homes and living in dire conditions, it's good to see some people are able to keep a sense of humour about things.

First it was the Minister for Sports of the North-West Frontier, who announced the holding of a sports festival in the IDP camps in Mardan, "to provide the refugees sports facilities." He obviously correctly surmised that the importance of adequate shelter, food rations, toilet facilities and electricity was being given undue importance by those actually working with the displaced, though he thought better of his initial idea of introducing lawn tennis as part of the sports festival.

Now we have an enterprising soul called Meher Tareen, who has announced the launch on June 7 of her summer collection of "limited edition" tee shirts, under the banner of Sublime.T, to support the fashionable war effort. In her own words (posted on facebook), she says:

"These slogan tshirts represent the Sublime patriotic and eco friendly theme of going green while showcasing uplifting messages in these troubled times to build patriotism and the general Pakistani spirit, fashionably.

Most importantly this new label marks Sublime’s support for the umbrella organisation Hum Pakistan and its Green Ribbon campaign. Hum Pakistan unites 20 Ngo’s with the common purpose of supporting Pakistan and is also currently dedicated to the repatriation of internally displaced citizens of the country."

What can one say about such patriotism that is not only sublime but also eco-friendly AND is dedicated to repatriation. I can almost see the army of volunteers dressed in Sublime tees, pushing the great unwashed in Mardan back to their homes. Could one ask for anything more?

"Sublime will be distributing green ribbons in support of this campaign and will also be channeling part of their sales proceeds to Hum Pakistan."

Oh my God! Will Ms. Tareen's generosity, patriotism and eco-friendliness never end? Not only do we get green ribbons (also limited edition and biodegradable, no doubt) for free, we get cotton t-shirts for, well, I assume less than a meal at Jason's Steak House in the PC. And although, she doesn't quite spell out what "part of their sales proceeds" mean, I am sure it is not less than 50 per cent of the tag price... 25 per cent?... well, at least 10 percent certainly.

But wait, there's more pep talk to get the nation into a fashionable frenzy:

"Please join Sublime-T this Sunday and be a part of this drive toward patriotism, unity and change."

Ok, so she threw in the 'change' bit just for kicks, since a "drive toward patriotism and unity" are usually antithetical to any kind of change. But what the hell. I'm not gonna let semantics come in the way of me and the Sublime Flagship Store on M.M. Alam Road! 

Ms. Tareen then lists all the "slogans" her sublime t-shirts will be carrying. While I find them entirely commendable, patriotic, uplifting and eco-friendly, I thought they could do with some little tweaks and additions. I have added my tweaks as comments to the original slogans. Let me know what you think or if you have other ideas. After all, anything for Pakistan!

Slogans:

1. My heart belongs to Pakistan

[The back should read: "My brain was repossessed long ago"]

2. J'adore Lahore

[Small print beneath that could read: "We Lahoris love French Fries Too." Or "The Heart Symbol Was Already Taken By Some Sod In Karachi." Or "Je déteste Faisalabad." Ms. Tareen should be careful about promoting this T-shirt in Mardan and Swabi though, since it might send the wrong message to the IDPs. In which case, it might be better to put another line on the back that says "So Keep the Displaced Out of the Punjab."

3. I believe in miracles

[Back: "I believe the Taliban will soon disappear" Or "My immigration is in process"]

4. The sun always shines on me

[Below: And out of my ...]

5. Yummy Mummy

[Below: "Only I Know What's Under My Hijab"]

6. I don't need to be rescued, you do!

[Alternative version: "I don't need to be repatriated, you do!"]

7. Addicted to tea

[Back: "The rest we don't talk about"]

8. Love is blind...marriage is a real eye opener!

[Small print on front under 'Love is blind': "I love Pakistan"; Small print on back under 'marriage is a real eye opener': "I'm married to notions of Muslim glory" 

9. Life is complicated enough,I like simple things

[Back: "Kill, kill, kill"]

10. Got it all!

[Back: "Including a green ribbon"]

11.Diva Pakistani

[Back: "And you thought Talibs were the worst thing about Pakistan"]

12. Pakistani Royal Tee

[Back: "With A Uniquely Pakistani Sense of Fashion"]

13.Made in Fabulous Pakistan

[Back: "Exported to Toronto"]

14.Viva La Pakistan

[Smart thinking. This'll come in handy as an exile in France or Spain. Alternative Version (to cover all bases) with Full Sleeves: "Viva La Islamic Republic"]

15. Be yourself. Who else is better qualified

[Back: "Except If You're Part of Lahore's Elite or Pakistan's Patriotic Fashionistas, It May Be Better To Be Someone Else"]

 

From Zamzama to Jalala

Just think. That family fleeing Swat, Buner or Dir could be yours darling. Ok I know it would be better, and certainly less heavily, dressed for the occasion. And I know Tinku is a lazy slob who hates going out without his Prado and that I NEVER miss that Nabeela appointment come what may. But there comes a time in the life of every man, woman and child when a decision, however traumatic, has to be made.

Even if your child's future at Grammar School is jeopardised.

And just think of the decisions you must make. I mean, do you take your cat who has travel sickness? Will there be tuna cat food available? Do you trust your maid with your wardrobe key and your chowkidar with the booze cupboard?

Well given that the Taliban are now approaching Ch Khaliquzzaman Road, I think there is no time to think. I hate being forced to wear stuff I don't like and Tinku prefers his French beard to other facial hair. And having to surrender our 42 inch HD flat screen Sony to some rude idiot is too horrible to contemplate.

So it's time to leave for Badin, which my cousin who has lands nearby assures me is quite safe. He tells me the locals are quite sufi so I suppose they won't be too hostile. Someone just set up a tentage village there, which I am assured, is quite particular about its admission policy. I hear a Sindh club membership card helps a lot here, so whatever you do don't forget that.

Given that we just donated 100 plastic water coolers, 150 lotas 300 bars of Lifebuoy soap to the Jalala lot at the office, can I just make a small appeal for the Badin camp where people like you and me are going to be? No lotas, water coolers and cheap soap please. Here are some quick tips on what you could donate:

For Her

Good sun block
Shades (would hate to be recognised on Dawn News queuing for the loo)
Fat free milk (soya for the vegans among us)
Some trashy bestsellers and lots of film magazines
The pill (might get romantic in that tent )

For Him

Chargers for i-phones and Blackberries (Shit, I always bloody forget it)
I-pods. Preferably loaded (no Bollywood numbers please)
USBs for laptops (PC and Mac)
Swiss knives (yar the bloody things have EVERYTHING)
Hip flasks (who knows, might bump into a bootlegger)
Condoms (you never know, there might be a hot babe in the tent next door)

Anything I have forgotten? Please let me know.

Name the Next Military Op

So, who says the Pakistani military is not divided? It is very much divided along language, at least as far as those who name military operations are concerned. One only has to take a look at the last two operations launched in Buner / Dir and now in Swat...

The Buner / Dir operation was/ is called "Black Thunder",  a name that was obviously coined by one of those hip officers more into James Hadley Chase or death metal than Abdullah Hussain or Iqbal Bano. But before those officers could crow about the coolness of their annointed name, the 'apni-zabaan'officers staged a counter-coup in the naming of the Swat operation. So now that one is called "Rah-e-Haq." Could it have been inspired by that 1965 Naseem Bano melody so beloved of the armed forces:

In any case, it seems that some sort of equilibrium is now in place within the armed forces wherein both of the English-wala and Urdu-wala groups can name every alternative military operation. I respectfully submit for consideration the following for subsequent ops:

The next English operation can be called "Operation The Unforgiven", "Operation Fade to Black", "Operation Shook Me All Night Long" or "Operation Highway to Hell". After that, since it would be the turn of the local boys, there really can be only one follow-up to "Rah-e-Haq": the next one should be called "Operation Wafa(q) ki Tasweeron".

Further suggestions welcome! :) 

Very Impotent Person

Omar Khan in the zombie-horror flick Zibahkhana may have been on to something.
There must be something in the water in Islamabad...


From Dawn.com

Musharraf willing to return to the helm of power
Saturday, 25 Apr, 2009 | 12:14 PM PST |


LAHORE: Former president General (retired) Pervez Musharraf has said he will be willing to take the president’s office once again if the country’s political and economic affairs continue their downward spiral.

Interviewed by the Al-Jazeera television channel, he said that he would mull over the chance of returning to his previous position if he thought he could play a meaningful role for the country.

Musharraf told Al-Jazeera that he had resigned because if he had continued he would have become ‘kind of an impotent president.’ He said he did not like sitting around uselessly and therefore chose to depart.

However, Musharraf said that since relinquishing his position, he was increasingly becoming ‘despondent’ about the country’s state of affairs, especially the situation in Swat, where the Taliban had been allowed by the government to introduce sharia law.

Imran Khan Makes A Mess Yet Again

OK, this was crying out to be deconstructed, and if anyone Khan, I must.

So, even as Mr. Imran "Find Your Roots and Eat Them" Khan sat in a shirt and trousers in the heat of Dubai watching Pakistan play Australia (funny how his roots assert themselves only in Pakistan), a long and muddled piece by him was on its way to be printed in The News. Grandly titled How To Clear The Mess, it purported to provide the prescription to Pakistan's myriad troubles with regards to terrorism and militancy, which astute readers may remember Immi bhai until recently saw as no problem at all. In any case, let's see what our warrior from Zaman Park has to say...

How to clear the mess
Thursday, April 23, 2009
By Imran Khan

The reason why there is so much despondency in Pakistan is because there is no road map to get out of the so-called War on Terror - a nomenclature that even the Obama Administration has discarded as being a negative misnomer.

First off, as far as I can see, the despondency has more to do with the unrelenting march of the Taliban and the government's and army's abject capitulation in Swat before them. But what do I know? I just live here, not in some fantasy-land of my own making.

To cure the patient the diagnosis has to be accurate, otherwise the wrong medicine can sometimes kill the patient.

Yeah, and to say nothing of attending to the right patient in the ward.

In order to find the cure, first six myths that have been spun around the US-led “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) have to be debunked.

OK, so Immi bhai's contribution to the debate is the coining of the term GWOT. Which is kind of like Otto's characterization of the chip as the British contribution to world cuisine in A Fish Called Wanda, but I digress...

Myth No. 1: This is Pakistan’s war

Since no Pakistani was involved in 9/11 and the CIA-trained Al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan, how does it concern us?

Yeah, how does it? I mean those 1395 people killed in 1842 attacks were not Pakistanis now were they? And Swat was always a provincially administered territory.

It is only when General Musharraf buckled under US pressure and sent our troops into Waziristan in late 2003-early 2004 that Pakistan became a war zone.

I kind of remember two or three suicide bombings in Karachi in 2002 and 2003. Plus I remember the sectarian radicalization of Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s beginning with General Zia (at the same time that Immi bhai was being lured out of retirement by the military dictator) and numerous attacks on mosques as well as the targeted killing of hundreds of Shia doctors and intellectuals. Some of these same sectarian outfits and Kashmiri jihadists such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Mohammad are now known to have strong Al Qaeda links. I even remember the fears expressed by civil society of the creeping Talibanization of the country from the mid-1990s (Shariah Bill anyone? Malakand insurgency in 1994?), long before 9/11... Aaah, but what do I know? Don't let facts stand in the way of your argument Immi bhai, please proceed...

It took another three years of the Pakistan army following the same senseless tactics as used by the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan (aerial bombardment) plus the slaughter at Lal Masjid, for the creation of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). If our security forces are being targeted today by the Taliban and their suicide bombers, it is because they are perceived to be proxies of the US army.

Yeah, dude, and so was the children's library in Islamabad that the Hafsa girls took over. As for the suicide bombing of imambargahs in Chakwal et al, everyone knows the Shia are proxies of the infidels.

Iran is ideologically opposed to both Al Qaeda and the Taliban yet why are its security forces not attacked by terrorists? The answer is because their President does not pretend to be a bulwark against Islamic extremism in return for US dollars and support.

Or, how about, that it locks up idiotic apologists like you and Qazi Hussain?

Michael Scheuer (ex-CIA officer and author of the book Imperial Hubris), writing in The Washington Post in April 2007, cited Musharraf’s loyalty to the US even when it went against Pakistan’s national interests by giving two examples: the first was Musharraf helping the US in removing a pro-Pakistan Afghan government and replacing it with a pro-Indian one; and, the second, for sending Pakistani troops into the tribal areas and turning the tribesmen against the Pakistan army. To fully understand Musharraf’s treachery against Pakistan, it is important to know that almost a 100,000 troops were sent into the tribal areas to target around 1000 suspected Al-Qaeda members - thus earning the enmity of at least 1.5 million armed local tribals in the 7 tribal agencies of Pakistan.

So, we come to the point. Taliban = pro-Pakistan = good. Of course, forget that the entire intelligentsia of the country had been crying hoarse about Pakistan establishement's misguided support to the brutal Taliban regime while the Americans were happily dealing with it and while "patriots" such as Hameed Gul and his ilk were propounding their stupid ideas of 'strategic depth.' Musharraf's treachery as the rest of the Pakistani establishment's treachery was actually that they waited to turn against the Taliban when the Americans told them to.

The most shameful aspect of the lie that this is our war is that the government keeps begging the US for more dollars stating that the war is costing the country more than the money it is receiving from the US. If it is our war, then fighting it should not be dependent on funds and material flowing from the US. If it is our war, why do we have no control over it? If it is our war, then why is the US government asking us to do more?

Ok, this I will concede: Our war should not be dependent on US dollars and the sooner we realize this the better for us. But the reason the US keeps asking us to do more (besides the byzantine political theatre they play) is because craven, cowardly Pakistani governments give in to the Taliban apologists of the army, media and politics (you being a good example) and the ruckus they raise.

Myth No. 2: This is a war against Islamic extremists - an
ideological war against radical Islam

Was the meteoric rise of Taliban due to their religious ideology? Clearly
not, because the Mujahideen were equally religious - Gulbadin Hekmatyar (supported by the ISI) was considered an Islamic fundamentalist. In fact, the reason the Taliban succeeded where the Mujahideen warlords failed, was because they established the rule of law - the Afghans had had enough of the power struggle between the warlord factions that had destroyed what remained of the country’s infrastructure and killed over 100,000 people.

True. But forgetting that it was the ISI that switched its support from Hekmatyar to the Taliban, many of whom were former mujahideen themselves.

If the Pushtuns of the tribal area wanted to adopt the Taliban religious ideology then surely they would have when the latter was in power in Afghanistan, between 1996 and 2001. Yet there was no Talibanisation in the tribal areas.

Considering that the Taliban brand of Islam was almost exactly what was practised in the tribal areas and many parts of the settled Pashtun areas, I'm not quite sure I follow. In Hangu (a settled area of the NWFP), I was told by a local in 1992 that the reason his particular area remained peaceful during sectarian mayhem, was because 'his people' didn't allow Shias and cinemas in their areas...

Interestingly, the only part of Pakistan where the Taliban had an impact was in Swat where Sufi Mohammad started the Shariat Movement. The reason was that while there was rule of law (based on the traditional jirga system) in the tribal areas, the people of Swat had been deprived of easy access to justice ever since the traditional legal system premised on Qazi courts was replaced by Pakistani laws and judicial system, first introduced in 1974.

Aaah, the plug for the jirga system. I wondered when it would bubble up.

The murder rate shot up from 10 per year in 1974 to almost 700 per year by 1977, when there was an uprising against the Pakistani justice system. The Taliban cashed in on this void of justice to rally the poorer sections of Swat society just as they had attracted the Afghans in a situation of political anarchy and lawlessness in Afghanistan.

Once again Immi bhai's dismissal of historical facts and dates takes my breath away. I suppose he considers such manipulation as innocuous as lifting the seam of a cricket ball. Sufi Mohammad's first insurgency in Malakand happened in 1994, when the Afghani force known as the Taliban had only just been formed. And it was actually as a result of the Frontier Crimes Regulations (in force in the Malakand area since 1979) being declared null and void by Pakistan's Supreme Court, creating the legal vacuum into which Sufi stepped with his lashkar, asking for the imposition of Shariah law. There is no doubt that the FCR (which contained elements such as collective punishment for individual crimes etc) were archaic and in some cases inhumane. But Pakistani law was not in force in Swat at that time and had the legal vacuum not been created by the Supreme Court's ruling, the results might have been different. Moreover, what is often harked back to as 'Shariah law' that existed in Swat before 1969, was in fact, the feudal law of the princely state of Swat as practised by the Wali of Swat. When the princely state was dissolved, Swat was brought under Pakistani law for a short time, until the inefficiencies of the state structure in providing swift and cheap justice (ala feudalism) led to a rebellion against the system. The same collapse has happened in other places in Pakistan where the feudal system has collapsed but that does not mean that the feudal structure should or can be re-introduced in a changed environment. But that is getting into understanding sociology and the dynamics of change which are probably beyond Immi bhai's limited capabilities.

It is important to make this distinction because the strategy to bring peace must depend on knowing your enemy.

I know who the enemy is. It's people who mangle facts and history to suit their point of view.

Michael Bearden, CIA station chief in Pakistan from 1986 to 1989, wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine that the US is facing the same Pushtun insurgency that was faced by the Soviets in Afghanistan. According to him, as long as NATO is in Afghanistan, the Taliban will get a constant supply of men from the 15 million Pushtun population of Afghanistan and the 25 million Pushtuns of Pakistan. In other words, this Talibanisation is not so much religion-driven as politically-motivated. So the solution to the problem in the tribal belt today does not lie in religion and “moderate” Islam but in a political settlement.

Interesting how Immi bhai keeps quoting those devil CIA-types to bolster his argument.

Myth No. 3: If we keep fighting the US war, the super power will bail us out financially through aid packages.

Recently, the Government’s Adviser on Finance stated that the war on terror has cost Pakistan $35 billion while the country has received only $11 billion assistance from the US. I would go a step further and say that this aid is the biggest curse for the country. Not only is it “blood money” for our army killing our own people (there is no precedent for this) but also nothing has destroyed the self-esteem of this country as this one factor.

Agree about the curse bit. But there is a precedent bhai. East Pakistan in 1971, the Baloch insurgency of the 1970s, the MRD movement of the 1980s, the MQM insurgency of the 1990s... oh forget it. You were still partying in Annabelle's at the time.

Moreover, there is no end in sight as our cowardly and compromised leadership is ordered to “do more” for the payments made for their services. Above all, this aid and loans are like treating cancer with disprin. It enables the government to delay the much needed surgery of reforms (cutting expenditures and raising revenues); and meanwhile the cancer is spreading and might become terminal.

Immi bhai the economist is almost cute. "Cutting expenditures and raising revenues"... now why hadn't anyone thought of that!

Myth No. 4: That the next terrorist attack on the US will come from the tribal areas.

First, there is an assumption, based purely on conjecture, that the Al Qaeda leadership is in the tribal areas.

What you really want to say is: there is an assumption, based purely on conjecture, that the Taliban in control of Pakistan would be a bad thing... Oh come out and say it.

In fact, this leadership could well be in the 70 % of Afghan territory that the Taliban control. More importantly, given the growing radicalisation of the educated Muslim youth - in major part because of the continuing US partiality towards Israeli occupation of Palestinian land - why can it not follow that the next terrorist attack on the US could come either from the Middle East or from the marginalised and radicalised Muslims of Europe, motivated by perceived injustices to Islam and the Muslim World.

It well could. You should ask your friends in the CIA why they don't write about this so you can quote them.

Myth No. 5: That the ISI is playing a double game and if Pakistan did more the war could be won.

If Talibanisation is growing in Pakistan because of the covert support of ISI in the tribal areas, then surely the growing Taliban control over Afghanistan (70 % of the territory) must be with NATO’s complicity?

Couldn't agree more. Or at least with the complicity of the Northern Alliance warlords. In fact, the Beeb just did a report about where the Taliban are getting their weapons from, which confirms this. But you didn't want me to agree, did you?

Surely a more rational understanding would be to see that the strategy being employed is creating hatred against the US and its collaborators. Aerial bombardment and its devastating collateral damage is the biggest gift the US has given to the Taliban. According to official reports, out of the 60 drone attacks conducted between 14 January 2006-April 8 2009, only 10 were on target, killing 14 alleged Al Qaeda. In the process almost 800 Pakistani civilians have been killed, while many lost their homes and limbs.

I wish you would tell us which official reports these are. The on-ground reports I have received in fact show that after the US stopped sharing intel about impending drone attacks with the Pakistan army, the efficacy of the attacks increased manifold. Since the Taliban / Al Qaeda immediately cordon off areas where the drones hit and remove any bodies related to them before anyone is allowed to go near them, I'm not quite sure where these figures have come from. But then again, you didn't really need proof to claim, like Qazi Hussain and Hameed Gul, that thousands of girls and children were killed in Lal Masjid, so I don't know why I should bother.

Despite its military surge effort, the US will eventually pack up and leave like the Soviets, but the “do more” mantra could end up destroying the Pakistan army - especially the ISI which is being targeted specifically for the mess created by the Bush Administration in Afghanistan.

Wow, Immi bhai, you as a champion of the ISI... I never would've guessed. That, by the way, is the exact thinking within the Pakistan army, which is why the Americans keep getting pissed off with them.

Myth No. 6: That Pakistan could be Talibanised with their version of Islam.

Both Musharraf and Zardari have contributed to this myth in order to get US backing and dollars. Firstly there is no such precedent in the 15-hundred years of Islamic history of a theocracy like that of the Taliban, outside of the recent Taliban period of rule in Afghanistan.

Sigh. Now even Islam predates Islam. Hey, dodo, we're still in Hijra 1430.

However, as mentioned earlier, the Taliban’s ascendancy in Afghanistan was not a result of their religious ideology but their ability to establish order and security in a war-devastated and anarchic Afghanistan.

We've covered this ground before. So, your point being? I feel it has something to do with accepting the ascendancy of the Taliban in Malakand because they have brought "peace." Right?

In Swat, the present mess has arisen because of poor governance issues. Also, it was the manner in which the government handled the situation - simply sending in the army rather than providing better governance - that created space for the Taliban. Just as in Balochistan (under Musharraf) when the army was sent in rather than the Baloch being given their economic and provincial rights, similarly the army in Swat aggravated the situation and the present mess was created.

Right. So we should all just shut up and hail the Taliban.

What Pakistan has to worry about is the chaos and anarchy that are going to stem from the radicalisation of our people because of the failure of successive governments to govern effectively and justly. Karen Armstrong, in her book The Battle for God, gives details of fundamentalist movements that turned militant when they were repressed. Ideas should be fought with counter ideas and dialogue, not guns.

I think you are about three decades too late with the argument about radicalisation of our people, a radicalisation one must add that was promoted by the people you count as your friends. But you could not get richer than saying "Ideas should be fought with counter ideas and dialogue, not guns." Hey, let me ask you a question, who of the numerous idiots around you writes your articles? Because, you see, Mullah Fazlullah, Baitullah Mehsud, Mangal Bagh, et al, I just don't recall them appearing on a televised debate or even putting forward their "ideas" in the press. As far as I recall, the gun (and the knife used to chop off people's heads) was their idea. I have another question, if you actually wrote this yourself: are you retarded?

Allama Iqbal was able to deal with fundamentalism through his knowledge and intellect. The slaughter of the fundamentalists of Lal Masjid did more to fan extremism and fanaticism than any other single event.

And I suppose, the stockpiling of heavy weapons in Lal Masjid was just in preparation of a debate about the vigilante raids on massage parlours and CD shops... Allama Iqbal could deal with fundamentalism because he rejected it outright. Of course, he had no Kalashnikov-toting, rocket-slinging Taliban to deal with who would have seen to raise his khudi from a lamppost had they been around. But I think he had the Lal Masjid terrorists in mind when he wrote:

Main jaanta hoon anjam uss ka
Jiss maarkay mein mullah hon ghazi

Pakistan is staring down an abyss today and needs to come up with a sovereign nationalist policy to deal with the situation. If we keep on following dictation from Washington, we are doomed. There are many groups operating in the country under the label of “Taliban”. Apart from the small core of religious extremists, the bulk of the fighting men are Pushtun nationalists.

You mean the ANP is part of the Taliban?! I knew it!

Then there are the fighters from the old Jihadi groups. Moreover, the Taliban are also successfully exploiting the class tensions by appealing to the have-nots.

Aah, so you read that New York Times piece too, I see...

But the most damaging for Pakistan are those groups who are being funded primarily from two external sources: first, by those who want to see Pakistan become a “failed state”; and, second, by those who wish to see the US bogged down in the Afghan quagmire.

How about those who don't see the danger of the Talibanisation of Pakistan?

What needs to be done: A two-pronged strategy is required - focusing on a revised relationship with the US and a cohesive national policy based on domestic compulsions and ground realities.

President Obama, unlike President Bush, is intelligent and has integrity. A select delegation of local experts on the tribal area and Afghanistan should make him understand that the current strategy is a disaster for both Pakistan and the US; that Pakistan can no longer commit suicide by carrying on this endless war against its own people; that we will hold dialogue and win over the Pushtuns of the tribal area and make them deal with the real terrorists while the Pakistan army is gradually pulled out.

I have news for you buddy. The Pakistan army has already pulled out and handed parts of the country to the terrorists. Or didn't you hear?

At the same time, Pakistan has to move itself to ending drone attacks if the US is not prepared to do so. Closure of the drone base within Pakistan is a necessary beginning as is the need to create space between ourselves and the US, which will alter the ground environment in favour of the Pakistani state. It will immediately get rid of the fanaticism that creates suicide bombers as no longer will they be seen to be on the path to martyrdom by bombing US collaborators.

Such as Shia imambargahs and funeral processions?

Within this environment a consensual national policy to combat extremism and militancy needs to be evolved centring on dialogue, negotiation and assertion of the writ of the state. Where force is required the state must rely on the paramilitary forces, not the army.

And, of course, negotiators such as the Commisioner Malakand Mohammad Javed, appointed at the insistence of Sufi Mohammad. But what about the paramilitary wanting to be trained by the US before it goes into a fight against the Taliban?

Concomitantly, Pakistan needs serious reforms. First and foremost we have to give our people access to justice at the grassroots level - that is, revive the village jury/Panchayat system. Only then will we rid ourselves of the oppressive “thana-kutchery” culture which compels the poor to seek adjudication by the feudals, tribal leaders, tumandars and now by the Taliban also - thereby perpetuating oppression of the dispossessed, especially women.

Yeah, the panchayat / jirga system is SO respectful of women, isn't it?

Second, unless we end the system of parallel education in the country where the rich access private schools and a different examination system while the poor at best only have access to a deprived public school system with its outmoded syllabus and no access to employment. That is why the marginalised future generations are condemned to go to madrassahs which provide them with food for survival and exploit their pent up social anger. We need to bring all our educational institutions into the mainstream with one form of education syllabus and examination system for all - with madrassahs also coming under the same system even while they retain their religious education specialisation.

Ok, finally, Immi bhai, some modicum of sense from you.

Third, the level of governance needs to be raised through making appointments on merit in contrast to the worst type of cronyism that is currently on show. Alongside this, a cutting of expenditures is required with the leadership and the elite leading by example through adoption of an austere lifestyle. Also, instead of seeking aid and loans to finance the luxurious lifestyle of the elite, the leadership should pay taxes, declare its assets and bring into the country all money kept in foreign banks abroad. All “benami” transactions, assets and bank accounts should be declared illegal. I believe we will suddenly discover that we are actually quite a self-sufficient country.

Once again, I agree. Let's start by you bringing your money to Pakistan.

Fourth, the state has to widen its direct taxation net and cut down on indirect taxation where the poor subsidise the rich. If corruption and ineptitude are removed, it will be possible for the state to collect income tax more effectively.

Ok, you're going econo-crazy again Immi bhai. "If corruption and ineptitude are removed"? Again, why didn't anyone think of that before?! You do realize, you'd have to step down from politics and stop writing thought pieces too, right?

A crucial requirement for moving towards stability would be the disarming of all militant groups - which will a real challenge for the leadership but here again, the political elite can lead by example and dismantle their show of guards and private forces.

Let's do this: ask all the political elite to dismantle their show of guards (I fully support this by the way) and then let's wait to see if the Taliban follow suit. They would follow good examples, right?

Finally, fundamentalism should be fought intellectually with sensitivity shown to the religious and heterogeneous roots of culture amongst the Pakistani masses. Solutions have to be evolved from within the nation through tolerance and understanding. Here, we must learn from the Shah of Iran’s attempts to enforce a pseudo-Western identity onto his people and its extreme backlash from Iranian society.

Ok. Let's sensitively send you wearing the clothes you were wearing in Dubai to talk to the Taliban in Swat and Buner. Up until now I thought the phrase "heterogeneous roots of culture" referred to precisely those things that the Taliban were against. But what do I know. I've never been to the Dubai cricket stadium.

The threat of extremism is directly related to the performance of the state and its ability to deliver justice and welfare to its people.

One small mathematical aside here: "direct relation" would imply that the better the state does to deliver justice and welfare, the more the threat of extremism would grow. I think you may have wanted to say "inversely related" but then, you're the pro-Taliban fundo. You should know.